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Abstract
I develop a new theory of marketing costs and introduce it into a model of trade with
product dierentiation and rm productivity heterogeneity. In this model, a rm enters
a market if it makes prots by reaching a single consumer there and pays an increasing
marginal cost to access additional consumers. This market penetration cost introduces
an extensive margin of new consumers in rms' sales. I calibrate the key parameters
of the model to match data on French rms from Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, in
particular the higher sales in France of rms that choose to export to more destinations.
The model predicts that most rms do not export, and that a large proportion of rms
that export in particular markets do so in small amounts. These predictions are in
line with the French data, but together create a puzzle for models with a xed cost of
exporting, such as those of Melitz and Chaney. Looking at the comparative statics of
trade liberalization, I nd that the model predicts large increases in trade in goods with
positive but little previous trade, in line with Kehoe and Ruhl. The model implies that
these increases can contribute to new trade signicantly more than the corresponding
increases due to new exporters.
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A recent literature has exploited ﬁrm and plant level data to uncover a set ofs t y l i z e df a c t sf o r
exporters. These facts are becoming a compass for theoretical research allowing the test of key
modeling assumptions. In particular, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) incorporate
CES Dixit-Stiglitz demand (product diﬀerentiation) and heterogeneity inﬁ r mp r o d u c t i v i t yt o -
gether with standard “iceberg” variable costs of trade in order to account for the predominant
heterogeneity in exporter performance within and across countries. Furthermore, Chaney (2007),
using the monopolistic competition framework of Melitz (2003), adds the assumption of a coun-
try speciﬁc ﬁxed cost of entry (market penetration cost) while specifying the productivities to
be Pareto distributed. This last framework has been shown by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2005) to account for the association between market size and ﬁrm entry along with features of
ﬁrm level data for large exporters in each given destination.
In this paper, I propose a new formulation of market penetration costs and introduce it into a
monopolistic competition model of trade with CES demand and ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity.
The model remains tractable and applicable to a variety of exercises, while it can also account
for a set of salient observations on cross-sectional data for exporters and the sales of exported
goods after trade liberalization episodes. These observations are puzzling in the view of the
uniform ﬁxed cost model. The formulation that I propose intends to broadly capture marketing
costs that the ﬁrm incurs in order to increase its sales in a given market. In the context of the
model, I specify market penetration costs building on seminal contributions in the advertising
literature such as those of Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). These costs are
endogenous rather than ﬁxed in the sense that paying higher costs allows ﬁrms to reach an
increasing number of consumers in a country. Yet, once a consumer is reached, these market
penetration costs remain ﬁxed with respect to the amount sold per consumer.T h ei n t e r a c t i o n
between the per-consumer marketing cost and the variable cost of trade excl u d e sﬁ r m sw i t hl o w
productivity from individual export markets, if their per-consumer revenue is not suﬃcient to
cover the cost to reach the very ﬁrst consumer there.
The new formulation allows my model to retain the main desirable predictions of the ﬁxed
cost models of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007). In fact, I prove that the (uniform) ﬁxed cost
1model postulated by the previous literature corresponds to a version of my model with constant
marginal costs to reach additional consumers. Departing from the standardﬁ x e dc o s tf r a m e w o r k
and in line with empirical evidence indicating diminishing returns to marketing outlays of ﬁrms
I assume that with each additional marketing eﬀort a ﬁrm reaches a smaller number of new
consumers. This increasing marginal costs assumption gives rise to an extensive margin of
consumers in the sales of the ﬁrm, namely the number of consumers that ﬁrms with diﬀerent
productivities sell to. Furthermore, in order to capture eﬀects of market saturation, I also assume
that this number becomes smaller at some geometric rate as the ﬁrm reaches larger fractions of
consumers in a market. This modeling of the market saturation eﬀect allows for a particular
convexity of the marginal cost function. The convexity in turns implies lar g ed e p a r t u r e sf r o m
the standard setting of the CES demand, with constant marginal costs of production, only for
the relatively smaller ﬁrms. Each of these ﬁrms exhibits substantial diﬀerences in the number of
consumers reached. However, for relatively large ﬁrms that ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reach almost all
consumers, the model behaves as the model with the CES demand.
Previous literature has postulated that ﬁrms incur signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs to export. For
example, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2005), examine a sample of Colombian exporters for the
period of 1981 to 1991. Using a dynamic model, they estimate (one-time) ﬁxedc o s t sf o rn e w
exporters ranging between $300,000 and $500,000 per ﬁrm. Yet, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2005) (henceforth EKK05) report that in 1986, the smallest 25% of French exporters in a
particular market each sold below $10,000 in that market. My model reconciles the typically
large estimates of ﬁxed costs with evidence on the existence of many ﬁrms exporting small
amounts to particular markets through the extensive margin of consumers mechanism. Relatively
productive ﬁrms choose to reach a large number of consumers in a market, incurring signiﬁcant
market penetration costs there. Relatively unproductive ﬁrms (yet productive enough to reach
the very ﬁrst consumer in the market) choose to reach only a few consumers in the market and
thus export tiny amounts.
To quantitatively assess the model, I calibrate its key parameters to matchd a t ao nF r e n c h
ﬁrms from EKK05. In particular, I calibrate the parameters of the model determining the
relative sales of diﬀerent ﬁrms to match the higher sales per ﬁrm in France ofﬁ r m st h a ta l s o
export to more markets. The remaining parameters of the model are calibrated to generate the
2relationship between the number of French ﬁrms entering exporting marketsa n dt h es i z eo ft h e s e
markets, as reported by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) (henceforth EKK04) and EKK05.
In particular, the number of French ﬁrms, normalized by French market share, and the average
sales per ﬁrm increase with the size of the exporting market.
In order to corroborate the last fact, EKK05 ﬁnd it essential to incorporate market-speciﬁc
ﬁxed costs that increase with the size of the market with an elasticity less than one. Instead,
I model market penetration costs as a common marketing technology available to all ﬁrms. I
use two realistic assumptions related to this technology, namely that there are increasing returns
to scale with respect to population size of each market and that marketing costs are partially
paid in terms of the importing country’s wages. Given these assumptions, my model provides an
intuitive explanation of the ﬁnding reported by EKK05 as the result of the optimal marketing
decision of ﬁrms aiming to reach consumers in markets with diﬀerent populations or per capita
income.
The calibrated model with endogenous market penetration costs is able to deliver a series
of new predictions. I use this new approach to address existing puzzles in international trade
theory.
First, I look at the sales distribution of domestic ﬁrms to a given destination. In the model,
the sales of ﬁrms that sell large amounts there are Pareto distributed whilet h es a l e so fﬁ r m st h a t
sell small amounts exhibit large deviations from that distribution. This prediction is in line with
the French data. Given CES demand and Pareto distribution of productivities, the prediction is
a result of the fact that percentage diﬀerences in the productivities of ﬁrms result to diﬀerences in
their sales that are proportionately larger for smaller ﬁrms. Mechanically, relatively unproductive
ﬁrms endogenously select a small number of consumers while large ﬁrms reach almost all the
consumers in the market. In fact, some ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal not to enter a market since reaching
the ﬁrst consumer is not proﬁtable for them. Thus, the model quantitatively accounts for the
small amounts exported by a large proportion of the French ﬁrms in each market, while it still
predicts that most French ﬁrms do not export. The small export volume of many ﬁrms has been
especially puzzling to the uniform ﬁxed cost model.
Second, deviation from the CES structure has important implications regarding the compar-
ative statics of trade liberalization. To illustrate these predictions I extend the methodology of
3Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) to data on goods that were positively traded prior to the US-Mexico
liberalization episode. I ﬁnd that the growth rate of the volume of trade of g o o d si sl a r g e rt h el e s s
the goods are traded before the liberalization. This feature of the data is in sharp contrast with
the predictions of existing models of trade that rely solely on the CES Dixit-Stiglitz demand
speciﬁcation such as the ﬁxed cost model. These models predict equal growth rates of trade
for all previously traded goods, given the uniform elasticity of substitution between goods. In
fact, models of this kind were used to predict trade patterns in the case of the NAFTA episode
and they were unable to predict the high growth rates of sales, especially for goods with little
trade prior to the trade liberalization, as Kehoe (2005) points out. I use mym o d e lt ol o o ka t
the comparative statics of trade liberalization, with parameters calibrated to the French data
and a symmetric change in the variable trade costs across goods calibrated to match the overall
increase in trade following the US-Mexico liberalization episode. The model captures the higher
growth rate in trade for goods with positive but little previous trade.
Finally, I study a new margin of response of aggregate trade ﬂows to decreases in trade costs.
This “new consumers” margin is meant to capture the faster growth of small existing exporters
after a trade liberalization. In my analysis, I decompose the contributiono ft h et h r e em a r g i n st o
new trade, the “new consumers” margin, the intensive margin of growth in per-consumer sales,
emphasized by Krugman (1980), and the new ﬁrms —new goods— margin analyzed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007). I ﬁnd that a considerable amount of new
trade is generated by new ﬁrms and by sales of previously exporting ﬁrms to new consumers.
However, for small changes in variable trade costs, the contribution of the new consumers margin
to new export sales is larger than the contribution of the new ﬁrms margin. New ﬁrms entering
a market, although numerous, sell a tiny amount.
In summary, this paper is a continuation of the literature incorporating ﬁrm level hetero-
geneity into international trade theory. This literature has emerged in response to the recent
use of ﬁrm and plant level data to measure the behavior of exporters along many dimensions
(see, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1995), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), Aw, Chung,
and Roberts (2000), or Tybout (2001) for a review). The empirical facts summarized by this
literature indicate that there exist substantial costs of exporting, as EKK04 point out. EKK05
ﬁnd that in order to account for a variety of facts related to French exporters, export costs have
4to take the form of both variable costs, that rise in proportion to the amount shipped, and ﬁxed
costs as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007). What I show here is that the assumption of a
ﬁxed cost of entry can be replaced with a new formulation of market penetration costs that will
substantially improve the quantitative predictions of the model.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: In section 2, I describe them o d e la n d
the new formulation of marketing costs in detail. In section 3, I calibrate the model using a
methodology developed by EKK05. In sections 4 and 5, I quantitatively assess the predictions
of the calibrated model. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
In this section I introduce the model with endogenous market penetration costs. This model in-
corporates the assumptions of product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity using
the monopolistic competition framework proposed by Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007). It de-
parts, however, from the existing literature in that each ﬁrm optimally chooses to incur increasing
costs so that additional consumers have access to its good in each market.
2.1 Consumer problem and demand for goods
I denote the source country by i and the destination country by j where i,j =1 ,...,N.C o u n t r yj
is populated by a continuum of consumers of measure Lj, uniformly distributed on [0,L j].T h e y
derive utility from consuming a continuum of goods indexed by ω according to a symmetric CES
utility function,
U
l =
µZ
ω∈Ωl
x(ω)
ρ dω
¶ 1
ρ
, 0 <ρ < 1 ,
where Ωl is the set of goods consumer l ∈ [0,L j] has access to. Ωl is a subset of the set of all the
goods sold in the economy, Ω.
Each good is produced by a single ﬁrm and ﬁrms diﬀer ex-ante only in their productivities
and their source country i. I consider a symmetric equilibrium where all the ﬁrms with the same
productivity, φ, from the same source country, i, charge the same price in destination j, pij (φ),
and in addition they reach a given consumer there with the same probability, nij (φ).T h e r ei s
5a continuum of goods of measure Ji that can be potentially produced by each country i, while
Mij ≤ Ji is the measure of ﬁrms from source country i operating in j.1 The productivities of
ﬁrms originating in i are drawn from a distribution with support [bi,+∞). I denote the density
of ﬁrms from source country i conditional on operating in j by µij (φ). Given the existence of
a large number of ﬁrms, every consumer from country j has access to the same distribution of
goods of diﬀerent types.2 Thus, while consumers may have access to a diﬀerent set of goods Ωl,
the measure of goods from country i that each one of them has access to equals
Mij
Z +∞
bi
nij (φ)µij (φ)dφ .
The representative consumer earns proﬁt ﬂows πj and labor income wj by (inelastically)
supplying her unit labor endowment to the labor market.3 The solution to the maximization
problem of the consumer gives rise to the usual CES Dixit-Stiglitz demand for each good φ
(conditional on the consumer having access to it). The demand of a representative consumer
from country j for a type φ good from country i is given by
xij (φ)=yj
pij (φ)
−σ
P
1−σ
j
,( 1 )
where
P
1−σ
j =
N X
υ=1
Jυ
bθ
υ ¡
φ
∗
υj
¢θ
Z +∞
bυ
pυj (φ)
1−σ nυj (φ)µυj (φ)dφ , σ =
1
1 − ρ
> 1 ,( 2 )
1Alternatively, one can think of J as the measure of diﬀerentiated varieties of goods available to ﬁrms
to produce. Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) show that the extension to a
context with an unbounded pool of entrants and free entry, as in Melitz (2003), gives rise to identical
predictions to one where this measure is ﬁxed as in Chaney (2007). In an online appendix I provide the
same result for my model, together with a variety of secondary facts and robustness checks about the
model and the data in this paper.
2This statement is essentially an implication of the Glivenko-Cantelli the o r e m ,w h i c hi si nt u r na
direct application of the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) for i.i.d. random variables. In order to apply
the LLN, I assume that ﬁrms reach consumers independently of each other. When applying LLN to
the case of a continuum of i.i.d. random variables technical problems may arise (see for example the
discussion in Hopenhayn (1992)). Various remedies have been suggested by diﬀerent authors (see e.g.
Uhlig (1996)). As is usual in the economics literature, I assume the applicability of the LLN without
proving the exact conditions under which it applies. This proof is a highly technical issue beyond the
scope of this paper.
3I assume that consumers own equal share of each ﬁrm originating in their country. Thus, proﬁts of
ﬁrms will be equally distributed among the consumers of their country.
6and yj = wj + πj denotes the per capita spending which equals the output per capita.
Given the existence of a large number of consumers, each ﬁrm φ reaches a fraction nij (φ) of
the consumers. Total quantity demanded for a ﬁrm with productivity φ from source country i
and selling to j is given by
cij (φ)=nij (φ)Ljxij (φ) .( 3 )
2.2 Firm
Each operating ﬁrm has to make two choices in order to maximize its proﬁt in each market.
First, it has to set a price for its good and produce the corresponding quantity demanded, qij,
using a constant returns to scale production function, q(φ)=φl,w h e r el i st h ea m o u n to fl a b o r
used in production and φ is the labor productivity of the ﬁrm. Delivery of the produced units
of the good to a certain destination requires standard iceberg costs to be in c u r r e di nt e r m so f
labor. Thus, for a ﬁrm operating in country i a n ds e l l i n gt oc o u n t r yj, τij > 1 units of the good
must be shipped in order for one unit of the good to arrive at the export destination. Without
loss of generality, I assume that τii =1 .4 Second, the ﬁrm must incur the required costs to reach
a certain fraction of consumers in each given market. This market penetration cost is described
below.
2.2.1 A theory of marketing costs and the market penetration technology
Marketing costs include the costs incurred by a ﬁrm during the process of promoting its product
and reaching consumers as well as establishing the related distribution channels in order to sell
its product. Evidence about the exact nature of these market penetration costs for the case of
exporting is provided by Keesing (1983) and Roberts and Tybout (1997). The authors discuss
a number of costs reported by managers of exporting ﬁrms in a series of interviews. These data
indicate that ﬁrms must research the foreign market by identifying and contacting the potential
consumers of their good. Hence, they must develop new goods or adapt their existing products to
foreign consumers’ tastes. Finally, the ﬁrms must set up direct or indirect distribution channels
in order to make the good available to the foreign consumers and to inform them about the
4If u r t h e ra s s u m eτij ≤ τiυτυj ∀(i,υ,j) to exclude the possibility of transportation arbitrage.
7existence of the good.5 Of course, all these costs have to be incurred in the domestic market in
as i m i l a rm a n n e r .
Marketing expenditures constitute a considerable amount of the overall spending of the econ-
omy. In fact, media advertising amounts to almost 2% of total GDP in the US for the years 2001
to 2004. Taking into account estimates indicating that media advertising spending accounts for
only 40% of overall marketing spending for 2001-2004, the amount of marketing spending could
be as much as 5% of GDP for these years.6
An important observation regarding marketing costs at the ﬁrm level is that decreasing returns
may arise as (i) less responsive consumers are reached or the same consumers respond less to
additional marketing eﬀorts, or (ii) an increasing amount of eﬀort has to bet a k e ni no r d e rt o
reach a consumer that has not yet been reached. While some evidence supporting this diminishing
returns assumption for marketing exists, most of the motivating studies come from evidence of
the best-measured portion of marketing expenditures, i.e. advertising. In particular, in the
most comprehensive study of the economics of advertising literature up to date, Bagwell (2007)
mentions that7
“Using various (e.g., logarithmic) measures, a number of studies regress sales on advertising
and oﬀer evidence that advertising’s eﬀectiveness is subject to diminishing returns. In essence,
these studies hold other inputs constant and argue that doubled advertising results in less than
doubled sales [...] On the whole, the studies that evaluate the eﬀectiveness of advertising suggest
that advertising often entails diminishing returns beyond a threshold level, where the threshold
level varies across circumstances and may be small.”
In order to understand the role that these costs play in international trade, I will develop
5Roberts and Tybout (1997) mention that ﬁrms can pay third parties to handle the distribution,
which, reportedly, is very frequently the case. If this last activity is characterized by free entry, then
market penetration can simply be reinterpreted as being handled by a third party hired by the ﬁrm.
6See the report on “US Advertising Volume” from Universal McCann available at
http://www.universalmccann.com and the “Marketing Expenditure Trends” reports of the London Busi-
ness School, available at www.london.edu/marketing/met.
7See also Simon and Arndt (1980), Sutton (1991) (e.g. p. 51) and Jones (1995). For a discussion
regarding diminishing returns to marketing expenditures, see Saunders (1987). Diminishing returns
to marketing are reasonable. It is eminently rational that marketing search eﬀorts will start through
marketing vehicles that will deliver the best consumer reach or the highest per-consumer sales. Then,
as marketing eﬀorts increase additional marketing spending will be less eﬃcient and marginal sales will
decrease as marketing expenditure increases.
8a formulation guided both by realistic assumptions as well as the facts regarding marketing
expenditures laid out above. The foundation of my theoretical approach will be twofold. On the
one hand, I will retain the framework with product diﬀerentiation and productivity heterogeneity
that has proven extremely useful in trade models. On the other hand, I will develop a consistent
framework that captures the stylized fact about marketing mentioned above while generalizing
the seminal contributions of Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In this framework I
envision the cost of market penetration as the cost of reaching a consumer in that market, while
this cost could be thought as isomorphic to the one of example (i) that was laid out above.8 The
simple marketing technology that I derive from fundamentals has two key properties. It implies
increasing marginal costs to reach additional consumers in a market and increasing elasticity of
the marginal cost function. While the increasing elasticity property deviates from the case of
constant elasticity of less than unity that the empirical studies mentioned above would suggest,
qualitatively the two cases give the same results for the key questions that I consider. In addition,
the formulation with this last property allows me to capture a market saturation eﬀect without
any additional modeling.9
For simplicity of exposition I will model marketing technology drawing on a simple example of
informative advertisement, where each advertisement (ad) sent by a ﬁrm is essentially a posting
that contains information about the existence of the good and its price. I denote by S the number
of ads sent by a ﬁrm. Further, I assume that the ﬁrm sends ads to the consumers independently
of other ﬁrms. Potential consumers are not aware of the price a particular ﬁrm charges unless
they observe a signal sent by the ﬁrm. I denote by n(S) the probability that a consumer sees
the ad at least once after S signals have been seen and I let n(0) = 0.10 Finally, I consider S, L
as continuous variables.
In my analysis, I have to pay particular attention to how the marketing cost to reach a
8In the online appendix I show that there exists an isomorphism with the case of marketing expen-
ditures that aﬀect the per-consumer sales rather than the number of consumers reached.
9Assuming that doubling marketing costs implies less than doubling sales can be explicitly modeled
using the function f + nβ,f>0,β > 1 and an upper bound on n to capture the eﬀect of saturation.
It is straightforward to show that this assumption will qualitatively generate the same deviations from
the CES demand structure as the ones that the function I use in the main text delivers. However,
quantitatively and methodoligically this alternative approach is clearly inferior.
10In the context of the maximization problem of the ﬁrm, the amount of marekting of the ﬁrm is
ultimately a function of its productivity and thus, S = S (φ),n= n(φ). Here, I describe a general
technology and suppress the φ notation until I consider the optimal decision of a type φ ﬁrm.
9number of consumers in a country varies across countries (assuming that the cost of sending an
ad is the same across countries) with diﬀerent population size, L. I view countries as distinct
markets such that marketing expenditures incurred for one market cannot inﬂuence the demand
in another. Thus, I assume that for each market:
Assumption 1 The number of consumers who see each ad is given by
L
1−α,α ∈ [0,1] .
This assumption allows for the possibility that the marketing technology exhibits increasing
returns to scale with respect to the population size of each market. It captures two extreme
examples. First, α =1corresponds to the example of advertising with ﬂyers where each ﬂyer
can be given to at most one consumer. This implies that in order to reach a given number of
consumers, the total spending is the same and is independent of the size of the market. Second,
the case that α =0can be described with the example of TV ads, which I assume reach a given
fraction of the consumers in any given market. In this case, a ﬁrm can reach double the number
of consumers in a country that is twice as large using the same number of ads.
In order to capture the diminishing returns to additional marketing expenditures I also assume
that the probability that each ad is seen for the ﬁrst time by a consumer is a function of the
percentage of people that have seen the ad up to now.
Assumption 2 The probability that a new ad reaches a consumer that has not seen an ad
before is given by
[1 − n(S)]
β ,β∈ [0,+∞) .
Notice that higher values of β correspond to more intense diminishing returns.
Given the two assumptions, a marginal change in the number of consumers reached through
a d si sg i v e nb y
n
0 (S)L = L
1−α [1 − n(S)]
β .( 4 )
Solving this diﬀerential equation subject to the initial condition n(0) = 0 gives
n(S)=1−
µ
1 − (1 − β)
S
Lα
¶1/(1−β)
.
10Inverting this last expression and solving for S gives the amount of advertising required by a
ﬁ r ma i m i n gt or e a c haf r a c t i o nn of the consumers in a market of size L. Assuming the labor
requirement for each ad is 1/ψ,t h el a b o rc o s to fr e a c h i n gn consumers in a market of size L
(market penetration cost) becomes
f (n,L)=
Lα
ψ
1 − (1 − n)
1−β
1 − β
, α ∈ [0,1] .( 5 )
This is the marketing cost function that I will use in the rest of the paper andt h u sId e l v e
into its properties. The marginal cost function is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 for diﬀerent values of β.
For the case of β>0, the following conditions hold:
lim
nL→0
∂f (n,L)
∂ (nL)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
L=L
=
Lα−1
ψ
> 0 .( 6 )
f1 (n,L) > 0, f11 (n,L) > 0 ,( 7 )
Expression (6) indicates that the cost to reach the very ﬁrst, or marginal, consumer is positive.
Expression (7) implies that the marginal cost of reaching new consumers is positive and is
increasing in the fraction of consumers reached. The elasticity of this cost function is larger the
higher the fraction of consumers already reached. In fact, as n → 1 the limit of the marginal cost
function tends to inﬁnity and thus the market eventually becomes saturatedf o re a c hﬁ r m .G i v e n
the CES demand, this saturation eﬀect implies that the model will behave similarly to a standard
model for the relatively large ﬁrms that reach almost all consumers. The case of β → 1 and α =1
is of special interest. This case corresponds to the example where ﬂyers arer a n d o m l yt h r o w n
to consumers. The probability that a consumer is reached is simply n(S)=1− exp{−S/L}.
Inverting this function implies that the number of ads needed to reach a fraction n of the
consumers in a market of size L is given by S = −Llog(1 − n). This is essentially the seminal
case explored by Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984).11 The benchmark case of β → 1
will also turn out to work well in connection with the trade data.
11The benchmark case could be also thought as a discrete “urn-ball” example where urns are the
mailboxes of the consumers and ﬂyers are the balls that are assigned to urn with equal probability. The
diﬀerence in the general case that I consider is that the probability that a ﬂyer is assigned to a mailbox
depends on how many ﬂyers have been already assigned to that mailbox.
11For the case in which β =0 , only condition (6) holds while the costs to reach additional
consumers remain constant. In this case, as I will prove below, the problem of the ﬁrm in my
model corresponds to that of the ﬁxed cost model.12
2.2.2 Marketing costs in terms of foreign and domestic labor
For the marketing activities related to exporting described above, the importing country’s labor is
oftentimes employed (see Keesing (1983) and Roberts and Tybout (1997)). For example, creating
distribution channels in importing countries may require hiring foreign labor for advertising
purposes. Hence, the market penetration costs are paid in terms of the importing country’s
wages. Yet, there is substantial evidence that part of the labor costs for marketing expenditures
are paid in terms of the exporting country’s wages. Therefore, I choose to combine this evidence
and consider a general case in which the market penetration cost of each ﬁrm is denominated
both in importing and exporting country’s wages. I make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 The production of marketing requires a bundle of labor services from source
country i and destination country j:
S = l
γ
jl
1−γ
i , 0 <γ<1 .
For simplicity, I also assume that γ i st h es a m ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .Iw i l le s t i m a t et h ev a l u eo f
all the parameters using trade data in section 3. The total cost of a ﬁrm from source country i
to reach a fraction nij (φ) of the consumers of country j with population size Lj is given by the
following expression (taking into account cost minimization by the ﬁrm):13
w
γ
jw
1−γ
i
Lα
j
ψ
1 − [1 − nij (φ)]
1−β
1 − β
.
12In the case of β<0, there are decreasing marginal costs to reach additional consumers. In the model
I consider, this case turns out to be equivalent to the one with β =0w h e r eﬁ r m sc h o o s ee i t h e rn =0or
n =1 . Therefore, without loss of generality, I do not consider the case of β<0. I can also allow for an
S-shaped marketing cost by deﬁning a function with β<0 below some threshold ˜ n and β>0 after that.
The results will change only to the extend that all operating ﬁrms will have am i n i m u ms i z eo fn ≥ ˜ n.
This minimum size, if substantial, comes in contradiction to the existence of many small exporters.
13For simplicity, I redeﬁne per unit advertisment costs 1/ψ to incorporate an extra term γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ.
122.2.3 Firm’s problem
Given the above, and substituting for consumer’s demand using equation (3), the problem that a
ﬁrm with productivity φ from source country i solves when considering whether to sell to market
j is given by
πij (φ)=m a x
nij,pij
(
nijLjyj
p
1−σ
ij
P
1−σ
j
− nijLjyj
τijp
−σ
ij wi
P
1−σ
j φ
− w
γ
jw
1−γ
i
Lα
j
ψ
1 − (1 − nij)
1−β
1 − β
)
(8)
s.t. nij ∈ [0,1] .
Total proﬁts of a particular ﬁrm are the summation of the proﬁts from exporting activities in all
the j =1 ,...,N countries (or a subset thereof). The optimal pricing decision of the ﬁrm is given
by:
pij (φ)=˜ σ
τijwi
φ
, ˜ σ =
σ
σ − 1
.( 9 )
Given this markup rule, we can ﬁnd the optimal market penetration decision for a ﬁrm with
productivity φ, nij (φ). For the case in which β>0, this rule is given by the FOC with respect
to nij when the ﬁrm can make positive proﬁts from entering market j.T h u s ,f o rφ ≥ φ
∗
ij, the
optimal nij solves14
yj
σ
³
˜ σ
τijwi
φ
´1−σ
P
1−σ
j | {z }
marginal revenue (net
of labor production
cost) per consumer
=
w
γ
jw
1−γ
i L
α−1
j
ψ
1
[1 − nij]
β
| {z }
marginal cost
per consumer
,( 1 0 )
where the threshold φ
∗
ij is deﬁned by15
φ
∗
ij =s u p
φ≥bi
{πij (φ)=0 } .( 1 1 )
14In order to interpret the LHS and RHS of expression (10) as marginal revenue and marginal cost
per consumer, the derivative with respect to nijLj has to be applied.
15I assume that parameters of the model are such that bi ≤ min
j
φ
∗
ij.
13The above deﬁnition implies that φ
∗
ij attains a simple functional form given by
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢σ−1 =
h
L
1−α
j y
1−γ
j (˜ στijwi)
1−σ ˜ ψP
σ−1
j /y
1−γ
i
i−1
. (12)
This expression is determined by ﬁnding the φ that solves equation (10) evaluated at nij =0 .
The LHS of equation (10) represents the marginal revenue (net of labor production costs) from
selling to an additional consumer while the RHS the corresponding marginalc o s t . I no r d e rt o
decide whether to enter a market or not, a ﬁrm compares the marginal revenue received from
the very ﬁrst consumer to the corresponding marginal cost of reaching her. However, due to
elastic demand, more productive ﬁrms charge lower prices and extract higher marginal revenue
per consumer. Alternatively, one can think of the marginal cost as the expected cost of sending
t h eﬁ r s ta dd i v i d e db yt h en u m b e ro fp e o p l et h a ts e et h i sﬁ r s ta d ,
cost of the ﬁrst ad
expected number of people that see the ad
=
w
γ
jw
1−γ
i /ψ
L
1−α
j
.( 1 3 )
For the case in which α<1, the cost to reach the ﬁrst consumer falls as the population
increases since the denominator in expression (13) increases. This decrease allows ﬁrms with
lower productivities, which have smaller per-consumer sales (see the RHS of (10)), to enter a
market with a larger population. Thus, for α<1, these markets will attract more ﬁrms.
Figure 2 plots the marginal revenue per consumer (net of labor costs) and the marginal cost
per consumer. The point of intersection in ﬁgure 2 corresponds to the soluti o nt oe q u a t i o n( 1 0 ) .
This intersection gives nij (φ) as a function of φ for the case of β>0. Notice that since marginal
revenue per consumer is higher for higher values of φ, more productive operating ﬁrms ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to pay the cost to reach a higher fraction of consumers, conditional on φ>φ
∗
ij.16
However, when the marginal cost to reach an additional consumer is constant, namely when
16In a model with heterogeneous productivity ﬁrms and homogeneous goods, Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu
(2006) also arrive at the conclusion that more productive ﬁrms reach a higher number of consumers
in the country. However, their mechanism is diﬀerent. In their model, each new advertisement is seen
by one consumer with certainty, but costs of sending additional advertisements are considered to be
convex. Firms that charge lower prices have higher probability of being the cheaper option for the
consumer who sees their advertisement. Thus, the expected revenue of each advertisement is higher for
more productive ﬁrms that can charge lower prices, and they choose to reach more consumers.
14β =0 , the decision rule is no longer continuous. Firms with φ ≤ φ
∗
ij choose nij (φ)=0and ﬁrms
with φ>φ
∗
ij choose nij (φ)=1 , resulting in the same decision rule as in the theory with ﬁxed
costs of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007).17 In the subsequent analysis I will refer to the case of
β =0as the ﬁxed (market penetration) cost model and to the case of β>0 as the endogenous
cost model. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 1 (Firm entry and market penetration decisions)
a) If β>0,t h e n
there exists a φ
∗
ij such that ∀φ,φ ≤ φ
∗
ij, nij (φ)=0 , and ∀φ1,φ 2,φ 1 >φ 2 ≥ φ
∗
ij =⇒ nij (φ1) >
nij (φ2) > 0.
b) If β =0 ,t h e n
there exists a φ
∗
ij such that ∀φ,φ ≤ φ
∗
ij, nij (φ)=0 , and ∀φ,φ > φ
∗
ij =⇒ nij (φ)=1 .
Proof. a) The existence of such a φ
∗
ij is proved formally in appendix A while the expression for
φ
∗
ij is given by equation (12). Also, notice that by solving (10) for nij (φ) > 0,
nij (φ)=1−
h
L
1−α
j y
1−γ
j (˜ στijwi)
1−σ ˜ ψP
σ−1
j /y
1−γ
i
i−1/β
.( 1 4 )
This equation together with the proof of uniqueness in appendix A gives the monotonicity of
nij (φ), ∀φ such that φ ≥ φ
∗
ij.
b) As long as β =0 , the marginal cost of reaching an additional consumer w
γ
jw
1−γ
i L
α−1
j /ψ is
constant with respect to nij (φ). Thus, every consumer brings the same marginal proﬁt to the
ﬁrm. Therefore, the ﬁrm chooses nij (φ)=1if this proﬁt is positive for all the consumers, and
nij (φ)=0otherwise. Since this marginal proﬁt is strictly increasing in φ,p a r tb) follows.
17A direct implication of the combination of the assumption of the diminshing returns to marketing
expenditures and ﬁrm heterogeneity is that the marketing to sales ratio will be higher for ﬁrms with
lower sales. A variety of studies reports evidence supporting this prediction (see for example Farris
and Buzzell (1979), Arndt and Simon (1983) and Thomas (1989)). Interestingly enough, this empirical
evidence led many researchers to hypothesize that larger ﬁrms are more eﬃcient in marketing, a claim
not supported in any convincing way by other empirical tests as Arndt and Simon (1983) point out.
My model generates lower marketing to sales ratios for ﬁrms with higher sales, even though every ﬁrm
has access to the same marketing technology.
152.3 Equilibrium
I deﬁne the cdf and the pdf of the distribution of the productivities of ﬁrms by Gi (φ) and gi (φ)
respectively, with support [bi,+∞). The probability that a ﬁrm is actually operating in the
economy corresponds to the probability that a ﬁrm has a productivity draw φ such that φ ≥ φ
∗
ij,
namely 1 − Gi
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢
. Thus, the measure of operating ﬁrms, Mij, is given by
Mij = Ji
£
1 − Gi
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢¤
.( 1 5 )
Furthermore, the pdf of the conditional distribution of ﬁrms is given by
µij (φ)=



gi(φ)
1−Gi(φ∗
ij) if φ ≥ φ
∗
ij
0 otherwise.
(16)
The above imply that the total export sales from country i to country j are given by:
Tij = Mij
Z ∞
φ∗
ij
nij (φ)pij (φ)xij (φ)µij (φ)dφ .( 1 7 )
Finally, by computing per consumer proﬁts,
πi =
N X
υ=1
Miυ
Z ∞
b
πiυ (φ)µiυ (φ)dφ/Li ,( 1 8 )
and using equality of income and output together with trade balance, the labor market clearing
condition can be expressed as
(wi + πi)Li =
N X
υ=1
Tiυ .( 1 9 )
I can now summarize the above discussion and deﬁne an equilibrium. Given bilateral tariﬀs
τij, an equilibrium for each i,j =1 ,...,N is given by a lower bound threshold productivity ˆ φ
∗
ij;t h e
measure of operating ﬁrms, ˆ Mij; the pdf of the distribution of ﬁrms productivities, conditional
on operating, ˆ µij (φ); a price index ˆ Pj; a per-consumer proﬁt ˆ πj;aw a g er a t e ˆ wj; allocations for
t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e rˆ xij (φ), production plan, ˆ qij (φ),a n do p t i m a lc h o i c e sˆ pij (φ), ˆ nij (φ),
16for ﬁrm φ, ∀φ ∈ [bi,+∞) such that:18
• Given ˆ Pj, ˆ wj, ˆ πj and ˆ pij (φ), the representative consumer solves her maximization problem
by choosing ˆ xij (φ) for the goods φ she has access to according to equation (1).
• Given ˆ Pj, ˆ wj, ˆ πj and the demand function cij = cij
³
pij (φ),n ij (φ); ˆ Pj, ˆ wj, ˆ πj
´
given by
equation (3) together with (1), ﬁrm φ chooses ˆ pij (φ), ˆ nij (φ) to solve its maximization
problem given by equation (8), ∀j =1 ,...,N.
• The threshold productivity ˆ φ
∗
ij is given by (12) and the measure of ﬁrms ˆ Mij by (15).
• T h ep d fo ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fo p e r a t i n gﬁ r m sˆ µij (φ) is given by (16).
• The price index ˆ Pj satisﬁes (2) and the per consumer proﬁt ˆ πj satisfying (18).
• The wage ˆ wj satisﬁes equation (19).
• The individual good markets clear, ˆ cij (φ)=ˆ qij (φ).
I now proceed to study the total sales of ﬁrms as functions of their productivities. The total
sales of a ﬁrm from country i selling to country j and having productivity φ are given by
nij (φ)Lj | {z }
extensive
margin of
consumers
yj
³
˜ σ
τijwi
φ
´1−σ
P
1−σ
j | {z }
intensive margin of
per-consumer sales
.
I nt h eﬁ x e dc o s tm o d e l ,ﬁ r m sc h o o s enij (φ)=1∀φ ≥ φ
∗
ij, and thus their sales inherit the
shape of the intensive margin which is of the standard CES Dixit-Stiglitz form: A percentage
diﬀerence in the productivity of ﬁrms translates into a proportionate diﬀerence in their sales per
customer, given constant marginal costs of production. These sales —even for ﬁrms with φ = φ
∗
ij—
begin at a positive threshold as can be seen in ﬁgure 4. However, in the endogenous cost model,
the simple addition of increasing marginal costs to reach additional consumers introduces a new
18For simplicity of notation I treat ˆ Pj as a suﬃcient statistic for the equilibrium choices of ﬁrms that
consumers and other ﬁrms take into account.
17margin in the ﬁrm’s sales: the extensive margin of consumers. While high productivity ﬁrms
reach almost all consumers, low productivity ones choose to reach a small fraction of them,
which could be arbitrarily close to zero as seen in ﬁgure 3. In addition, for β>0,p e r c e n t a g e
diﬀerences in the productivities of ﬁrms translate into changes in their extensive margin that are
proportionately smaller for ﬁrms with larger productivities. This asymmetry is the result of the
feature of increasing elasticity of the marginal market penetration cost function. The mechanics
of the extensive margin will be key for accounting for observations in the trade data.
To derive stark predictions from the model, and in order to generate sales consistent with the
empirically observed distribution of sales of ﬁrms (see Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2006)), I make
a particular assumption regarding the distribution of productivities. Similar to Helpman, Melitz,
and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney (2007), I assume that the productivity of ﬁrms is drawn from a
Pareto distribution with shape parameter θ>σ−1,c d fGi (φ)=1−bθ
i/φ
θ, pdf gi (φ)=θbθ
i/φ
θ+1
and support [bi,+∞),w h e r ebi can be interpreted as the level of technology.19 The measure of
operating ﬁrms becomes Mij = Jibθ
i/
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θ.
Finally, substituting for φ
∗
ij and nij (φ) using equations (12) and (14), and using trade balance
to express proﬁts πi as a function of total income yi (see appendix B), the sales of a ﬁrm with
productivity φ from source country i selling to country j can be expressed as:
rij (φ)=

 
 
Lα
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i
1
˜ ψ
³
φ
φ∗
ij
´σ−1 µ
1 −
³
φ∗
ij
φ
´(σ−1)/β¶
if φ ≥ φ
∗
ij
0 otherwise
,( 2 0 )
where ˜ ψ = ψ/[σ(1 − η)],a n dη =( σ − 1)/(θσ) is the share of proﬁts out of total income.
Observe that the case of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2007) emerges by setting α, γ =0and
taking β → 0:
rij (φ)=



yi
1
˜ ψ
³
φ
φ∗
ij
´σ−1
if φ ≥ φ
∗
ij
0 otherwise,
where 1/˜ ψ incorporates 1/ψ which corresponds to the ﬁxed cost in their case.20
19See Kortum (1997), Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005), Gabaix (1999), Luttmer (2006), and
Arkolakis (2007) for theoretical justiﬁcations of using this distribution of productivities.
20Chaney (2007) solves the model with β =0allowing for market speciﬁc ﬁxed costs 1/ψij.
183C a l i b r a t i o n
The model is particularly simple to calibrate by following a methodology similar to the one
developed by EKK05. In particular, the parameters of the model can be set directly by looking
at 1) the relationship between the number of ﬁrms selling to at least some given number of
markets and the sales of these ﬁrms in France and 2) the relationship betweent h en u m b e ro f
French entrants per country, and the population and income per capita of that country.
3.1 Parameters determining the relative sales of ﬁrms
I will consider the sales of French ﬁrms in France as a function of the number of other countries
the ﬁrms serve. I denote by M
(k)
FF the measure of French ﬁrms selling to France and to at
least k additional countries. The sales of these ﬁrms in France, T
(k)
FF, are given by the following
expressions (see appendix D)
β =0: T
(k)
FF = M
(0)
FFL
α
FyF
1
˜ ψ
µ
M
(k)
FF
M
(0)
FF
¶1−1/˜ θ
1 − 1/˜ θ
,( 2 1 )
β>0: T
(k)
FF = M
(0)
FFL
α
FyF
1
˜ ψ

   

µ
M
(k)
FF
M
(0)
FF
¶1−1/˜ θ
1 − 1/˜ θ
−
µ
M
(k)
FF
M
(0)
FF
¶1−1/(˜ θ˜ β)
1 − 1/
³
˜ θ˜ β
´

   

,( 2 2 )
where I deﬁne for simplicity
˜ θ =
θ
σ − 1
, ˜ β =
β
β − 1
.
In the model, ˜ θ determines the sales advantage of more productive ﬁrms in the intensive margin
of per-consumer sales. The parameter β, that regulates adjustments in the extensive margin of
consumers, governs the ability of ﬁrms to reach a larger fraction of the consumers in a market
given that they enter that market.
Figure 6 plots the logarithm of total sales of French ﬁrms in France as a function of the number
of ﬁrms selling to k or more countries. The relationship suggests a slope of 0.35 indicating that
ﬁrms that export to more markets sell also on average more in France. This slope implies an
19approximate value of ˜ θ of 1.5 for the model with β =0(more details are given in appendix D).
However, the ﬁxed cost model overpredicts (by around 77%) the total sales ofa l lF r e n c hﬁ r m s .
Given the parameter ˜ θ =1 .5, the model with β =1delivers a better ﬁt to the relationship
in the right tail as depicted in ﬁgure 6. The reason for the better ﬁt of the endogenous cost
model is that ﬁrms that sell to only a few destinations are not only the least productive ones,
but also choose to reach only a few consumers in France, that is, nFF (φ) is close to 0.W h e n
one accounts for these ﬁrms, the total sales in France increase much slower as a function of the
number of destinations served than the simple ﬁxed cost model would predict. The results of
the above analysis suggest a β closer to 1 rather than to 0. Thus, I choose the value of β =1as
a benchmark value for the endogenous cost model throughout the remainder of my analysis.
3.2 Parameters determining total exports and number of exporters
The use of the Pareto distribution allows for analytical expressions for the fraction of spending
by country j on goods from country i,21
λij =
(τij)
−θ (bi)
θ w
(1−γ)(1−˜ θ)−θ
i
N P
υ=1
(τυj)
−θ (bυ)
θ w
(1−γ)(1−˜ θ)−θ
υ
.( 2 3 )
Notice that this expression is comparable to the one derived by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
in fact it can be shown that it also leads to a standard gravity equation. The diﬀerence with the
corresponding expression in Eaton and Kortum (2002) is that in equation (23) the trade shares
are more sensitive to wages given the additional term (1 − γ)(1−˜ θ). However, given that ˜ θ =1 .5
and γ ∈ [0,1] I can use their estimation, for the elasticity of trade shares with respect to wages,
of 8.28 and thus set θ =8 .22 With this value for θ, the estimation of ˜ θ =1 .5 implies σ =6 .33.23
21Without loss of generality, I set Ji = J.
22Eaton and Kortum (2002) use data on bilateral trade shares, prices, and distance as a proxy for trade
costs for a cross section of countries. Their estimation corresponds to estimating the parameter governing
the elasticity of substitution between goods for models with the Armington aggregator. Romalis (2005)
estimates the later elasticities using data on trade and tariﬀs studying the countries that joined the
NAFTA. He ﬁnds parameter values for the elasticity of substitution in the range of 6.2 to 10.9, which
are consistent with the estimate of Eaton and Kortum.
23The value of σ =6 .33 is higher than values used in the business cycles literature (around 2)o rv a l u e s
previously estimated using models of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms (e.g. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
20To calibrate the remaining parameters, α and γ, I begin by expressing the total export sales
of French ﬁrms (F)t oc o u n t r yj as:
TFj = λFjLjyj .( 2 4 )
Alternatively, I can express export sales as the measure of exporting ﬁrms times average export
sales per ﬁrm:
TFj = MFjL
α
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
F
1
˜ ψ

 1
1 − 1/˜ θ
−
1
1 − 1/
³
˜ θ˜ β
´


| {z }
average sales per ﬁrm
.( 2 5 )
Combining the two expressions above, I obtain:
MFj
λFj
= L
1−α
j y
1−γ
j

(yF)
1−γ 1
˜ ψ

 1
1 − 1/˜ θ
−
1
1 − 1/
³
˜ θ˜ β
´




−1
.( 2 6 )
Expression (26) relates the number of French ﬁrms exporting to country j, normalized by
French market share in country j, to the population and output per capita of that country. In
fact, this expression implies that higher entry of ﬁrms in a market is related to higher returns to
scale with respect to population size for the marketing technology (lower α)a n dl o w e rf r a c t i o n
of marketing costs paid in terms of importing country’s wages (lower γ). Therefore, by modeling
a common marketing technology across all ﬁrms and making realistic assumptions related to this
marketing technology (assumptions 1 and 3), the model is able to capture a robust ﬁnding of
EKK05: the number of French ﬁrms in a market, normalized by French market share, increases
with the size of the market with an elasticity less than one.
For my estimation I use data on French ﬁrm entry per market from EKK04 and EKK05,
a n do np o p u l a t i o na n dm a n u f a c t u r i n ga b s o r p t i o np e rc a p i t a( a sap r o x yf o ro utput per capita),
which I describe in appendix E. Taking natural logarithms of expression (26) I run the following
regression, indicating the data counterpart of the variables with the use of an upper bar (robust
Kortum (2003) report that σ =3 .79 is the value that allows their model to match the sales advantage
of exporters in the US data). However, the value of σ =6 .33 yields a mark-up of around 1.2, which is
consistent with mark-ups reported in the data (see Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996)).
21standard errors in parentheses)
ln(MFj/λFj)=−2.74
(.628)
+0 .56
(.034)
ln ¯ Lj +0 .69
(.028)
ln ¯ yj .( 2 7 )
The R2 of the regression is .89. The coeﬃcients are less than one, as predicted by the theory.
A formal econometric test rejects the hypothesis that these coeﬃcients aret h es a m ea tt h e1%
level, further supporting the validity of assumptions 2 and 3. The estimation implies that the
cost to reach a given number of consumers decreases with an elasticity of .56 with the size of the
population. It also suggests that around 1/3 of the marketing costs to reach foreign consumers
are paid in terms of the importing country’s wages. The value of γ = .31 is diﬀerent than the
ones typically assumed in the literature i.e. γ =0—in terms of the exporting country’s wages
only— as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) or γ =1—in terms of the importing country’s wages only—
as is implicit in EKK05. Finally, though not important for my exercises, thec o n s t a n to ft h e
regression can be used to determine 1/ψ (see equation (25)).
Summarizing, the calibration yielded the following parameters for the endogenous cost model:
θσβ αγ
86 .33 1 .44 .31
.
Notice that throughout the rest of my analysis I keep the parameters of the model as calibrated
using the French data. While the parameters α,γ aﬀect only aggregate ﬂows, ˜ θ = θ/(σ − 1) and
β also regulate the relative size across diﬀerent ﬁrms. Thus, I explore the extent to which the
benchmark model with β =1can be useful in explaining regularities in the trade data that the
ﬁxed cost model could not address. The results are robust to alternative calibrations of ˜ θ, β.
4 Market Penetration Costs and Puzzles in International
Trade
In this section I look at the predictions of the parametrized model for the cross-sectional sales of
ﬁrms and the comparative statics of trade liberalization.
224.1 The distribution of sales
In ﬁgure 7 I plot the sales distribution of French ﬁrms to Portugal, which is one of the 113
markets studied by EKK05, including France. The authors report that the characteristics of the
sales distribution of French ﬁrms across markets are very robust. Thus, thec h o i c eo fa na v e r a g e
size exporting market, such as Portugal, is very representative. A noticeable feature of the sales
distribution across markets is the large proportion of French ﬁrms sellingt oap a r t i c u l a rm a r k e t
that sell small amounts in that market. In addition, the distribution of sales for the relatively
larger ﬁrms selling in each given destination exhibits Pareto tails.
In the model, the sales of a ﬁrm with productivity φ from country i to j are given by equation
(20). I deﬁne the smallest sales (revenues) of ﬁrms from country i to j as rmin
ij . In the ﬁxed cost
model, the minimum sales in country j that correspond to ﬁrms with productivity φ = φ
∗
ij are
r
min
ij = L
α
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i /˜ ψ .
In the case of the endogenous cost model, when β>0, the minimum sales for ﬁrms with
productivity φ = φ
∗
ij are
r
min
ij =0.
The distribution of sales, Pr
£
R<r |R ≥ rmin
ij
¤
= Fij (r), can be solved analytically for β =0 ,1
(see appendix C):
β =0: Fij (r)=1−
Ã
r
Lα
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i /˜ ψ
!−˜ θ
r ≥ r
min
ij ,( 2 8 )
β =1: Fij (r)=1−
Ã
r
Lα
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i /˜ ψ
+1
!−˜ θ
r ≥ r
min
ij .( 2 9 )
In ﬁgure 7, I show that the ﬁxed cost model, parameterized to match the fact that most
ﬁrms do not export, overpredicts the size of the smallest exporters (1st percentile) by a factor of
150. Thus, the model also underpredicts the size of the largest exporters (99th percentile) by a
factor of around 1.7. However, the predictions of the endogenous cost model are closely aligned
with the data. In particular, the model predicts the large number of small exporters —for the 1st
23percentile it only overpredicts sales by a factor of 1.5— and improves upon the predictions of the
ﬁxed cost model across all percentiles.
The reason for the improved prediction of the endogenous cost model is the mechanism
illustrated in section 2: ﬁrms with lower productivities not only sell less per consumer, but also
to fewer consumers. The absence of indivisibilities in the marketing costsi m p l i e sas m a l ls i z e
for the low productivity ﬁrms. This fact combined with the increasing elasticity of the marginal
market penetration cost function captures both the existence of small exporters and the curvature
in the sales distribution of small exporters that EKK05 report. In terms of a sales distribution in
a logarithmic scale, the endogenous cost model implies that the distribution exhibits curvature
for relatively small ﬁrms while it still retains a linearity for the larger ones. Summarizing, the
endogenous cost model, calibrated to match the size advantage in France of proliﬁc exporters, is
able to reproduce the sales distribution of French ﬁrms in each particular market.
4.2 Trade ﬂows and bilateral trade liberalizations
Using the parameters inferred from the size advantage in France of proliﬁc exporters, I will
subject the model to a further test by looking at its predictions in a trade liberalization episode.
The analysis in this dimension is constrained from the unavailability of ﬁrm level data on the
sales of exporting ﬁrms before and after a liberalization episode. Therefore, I will use the best
available proxy which is very disaggregated goods data. I will also make use of the strict mapping
that my model implies, meaning that each ﬁrm produces only one good. Thus, int h er e s to ft h i s
section I will treat each goods category as if it was produced by one ﬁrm.
I measure the increase in trade ﬂows for the previously traded goods extending the method-
ology of Kehoe and Ruhl (2003). In particular, Kehoe and Ruhl study the contribution of least
traded goods (including previously nontraded) to the total increase in trade after trade liberal-
ization. Instead, I consider the particular contribution of the least traded goods, conditional on
being positively traded before liberalization, to the total increase in trade after the liberalization.
In my analysis, I use data from the OECD International Trade by Commodity database
(see appendix E for details) on US imports from Mexico recorded in 6-digit Harmonized System
(HS) encoding. Below I construct a classiﬁcation of the goods. I call the goods traded before
24the liberalization and throughout 1990-92 “previously traded” goods. I divide the “previously
traded” goods in 10 categories with equal number of goods. These categories include goods in
an increasing order of volume of trade: category 10 includes the “previously traded” goods that
were on average most traded in 1990-92, while category 1 the least traded ones. The goods that
were traded in 1997-99 (at least once in these three years) but not throughout all the years of
1990-92 are referred to as “newly traded” goods. I also divide the “newly tra d e d ”g o o d si n t ot w o
categories depending on whether they were continuously traded throughout 1997-99 (category 1)
or traded in some of these years (category 2). Finally, I will refer to the goo d st h a tw e r et r a d e d
in some of the years of 1990-92 but were not traded in 1997-99 as “newly nontraded” goods.
The OECD database provides information on US imports from Mexico for 5402 goods. 2298
of these goods were positively traded throughout 1990-92 and thus each category of “previously
traded” goods consists of 230 goods (with category 10 consisting of 229 goods). The number of
“newly traded” goods is 1767 and 907 of these belong to category 1 of “newly traded” goods,
while the remaining 860 constitute category 2 of the “newly traded” goods. Finally, the dataset
contains 230 “newly nontraded” goods and 1107 goods that were never traded.
Table 1 provides information on the share of trade for each of the categories of traded goods
d e ﬁ n e di nt h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h .I tr e p o r t st h es h a r eo u to ft o t a lt r a d ei n1990-92 and 1997-
99. It also reports the contribution of each of the categories of “previously traded” and “newly
traded” goods to new trade among these goods. In fact, as table 2, shows the share of the
15% least traded goods from the “previously traded” goods in 1990-92 increased to almost 25%
amongst the same goods. A more clear pattern is depicted in ﬁgure 8 where I plot the natural
logarithm of the ratio of imports from 1997-99 to imports from 1990-92 for each category of
“previously traded” goods. The percentage increase of trade ﬂows is higher the less tradable the
good is in 1990-92. My analysis indicates that while “newly traded” goods are numerous, they
also are of small trade volume on average. Thus, a large part of the new goods trade accounted
by Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) can actually be interpreted as new trade of “previously traded” goods
that were least traded before liberalization.
Kehoe (2005), in an evaluation of Applied General Equilibrium models used to evaluate the
eﬀects of the NAFTA, concludes that no plausible parameterization can make models based solely
on the CES Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation match the trade ﬂows after the NAFTA liberalization.
25He points out that this failure is exactly due to their inability to predict high growth in trade for
goods with low volume of trade prior to the liberalization. The endogenous cost model features
deviations from the CES demand structure that can account for the faster growth rates of trade
for goods with little previous trade. In the endogenous cost model even a small decrease in
variable trade costs that brings about a small increase in the marginal revenue per consumer
makes a proportionately larger expansion of the consumer base of these goods proﬁtable.24 The
following proposition formalizes the above argument.
Proposition 2 (Elasticity of trade ﬂows and ﬁrm size)
Assume that all countries are symmetric with τii =1∀i and τij = τiυ > 1 ∀j,υ, s.t. j,υ 6= i.
Deﬁne a symmetric trade liberalization as τ0
ii =1∀i and τ0
ij ∀i 6= j such that τij >τ 0
ij ≥ 1 ∀i 6= j,
and τ0
ij = τ0
iυ ∀j,υ s.t. j,υ 6= i. Then:
T h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft r a d eﬂ o w so fag o o dw i t hr e s p e c tt oτij, ∀i 6= j,i sh i g h e rt h el o w e rt h ep r o d u c -
tivity φ that the good is produced with, for all φ s.t. φ ≥ φ
∗
ij.
Proof. Normalize wj =1∀j =1 ,...,N. It can be shown that the new τ0
ij i 6= j,g i v e nτ0
ii =1 ,
results in a decrease of φ
∗
ij ∀i 6= j. It is, therefore, suﬃcient to focus the analysis on computing the
elasticity of trade ﬂows rij (φ) with respect to a change in φ
∗
ij, namely ζ = −dlnrij (φ)/dlnφ
∗
ij.
This elasticity is higher for low initial productivity φ,25
ζ =( σ − 1)
| {z }
intensive margin
of per-consumer
sales elasticity
+
σ − 1
β
"µ
φ
φ
∗
ij
¶(σ−1)/β
− 1
#−1
| {z }
extensive margin of
consumers elasticity
.
Notice that ζ = ζ (φ) and is decreasing in φ and thus decreasing in initial export sales. In fact,
as β → 0 , ζ (φ) → (σ − 1) ∀φ ≥ φ
∗
ij.
24In order to generate observationally equivalent results to the ones of the model presented here
alternative explanations have to deviate from the assumptions of CES demand given the CRS production
function. DRS in production is clearly an unrealistic assumption to the extend that it has to be assumed
for the production of the ﬁrm to each destination. Alternative plausible explanations are non-CES
forms of demand such as the one assumed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2007). The additional quantitative
advantage of the approach I follow, apart from the tight association to the data for the set of question
I address, is that my framework retains all the previous desirable properties of the Melitz-Chaney
framework pointed out by EKK05 (e.g. the log-linear association between ﬁrm entry and market size).
25Since the general equilibrium eﬀect is the same across goods I set for simplicity ∂ lnφ
∗
ij/∂ lnτij =1 .
26To quantitatively assess the ability of the models to match the patterns of trade ﬂows after
trade liberalizations I choose the reduction in variable trade costs so that the two models match
the total growth in the trade in “previously traded” goods. The ﬁxed cost model requires a 12.5%
decrease in variable trade costs, while the endogenous cost requires only a 9.5% decrease (further
details are given in appendix E). In ﬁgure 8, I plot the two models’ predicted increase in growth
for each category of “previously traded” goods along with the actual data. The endogenous cost
model delivers a close match to the data, while the ﬁxed cost model falls short of predicting the
empirical pattern.
The interaction between the extensive margin of consumers and CES preferences allows the
endogenous cost model to successfully replicate the increase in trade ﬂows after the introduction
of NAFTA, providing a solution of the puzzle reported by Kehoe (2005). In the next section, I
analyze the role the new consumers margin plays in international trade through its contribution
in new trade ﬂows after a trade liberalization.
5 How important is the new consumers margin in inter-
national trade?
I nt h ea b o v ea n a l y s i sIh a v ei n t r o d u c e dan e wm a r g i no fa d j u s t m e n ti ne x p o r tsales, namely
the extensive margin of consumers of each ﬁrm. This new margin captures the faster growth
of smaller ﬁrms, which is an implication of the deviation from the CES demand structure. To
evaluate the importance of the growth of small ﬁrms during a trade liberalization episode, I
proceed to decompose the three margins of adjustment of aggregate trade ﬂows that the
model features in the event of a trade liberalization:
i) Intensive margin growth (total growth in per-consumer sales)
ii) The new consumers margin (total growth in the extensive margin of consumers)
iii) The new ﬁrms —new goods— margin (total growth in the extensive margin ofﬁ r m s )
I refer to the extensive margin of ﬁrms as the number of ﬁrms exporting. The intensive
margin of per-consumer sales is the sales of the ﬁrm to each of its customers in a market.
Essentially, previous literature used the intensive margin to refer to what I call here the extensive
27margin of consumers multiplied by what I call the intensive margin of per-consumer sales. In the
endogenous cost model, as a source country becomes more expensive each ﬁrm of this country
exports to a narrower set of consumers. In contrast, in models with adjustments mainly in the
extensive margin of ﬁrms-goods, more expensive countries mainly export in a narrower set of
goods (as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)).26 Finally, in models with monopolistic competition but
homogeneous ﬁrms, as in Krugman (1980), the only adjustment is through the intensive margin
of per-consumer sales.
In recent years an increased amount of attention has been given to the new ﬁrms —new goods—
margin. This attention stems partly from the ability of models with this margin of adjustment
to exhibit large increases in trade with small decreases in trade costs, without assuming unreal-
istically high elasticities of substitution.27 The elasticity of trade ﬂows with respect to changes
in variable trade costs is θ both for the endogenous and the ﬁxed cost model. Chaney (2007)
has shown that this aggregate elasticity can be decomposed in the ﬁxed cost model into the
contribution of the new ﬁrms margin with an elasticity of θ − σ +1and of the intensive margin
of σ − 1. However, in the endogenous cost model, when decomposing the importance ofe a c ho f
the margins, the contribution of the new ﬁrms margin is minimal (at least for small reductions
in the variable trade costs) while the contribution of the extensive margino fc o n s u m e r si sw i t h
an elasticity of θ − σ +1 . The following proposition formalizes the above discussion following a
methodology similar to Chaney (2007).
Proposition 3 (Trade elasticities in the endogenous cost model)
Assume β>0.T h e n
a) The elasticity of trade ﬂows with respect to variable trade costs τij is θ.
b) For small changes in variable trade costs τij, changes in the new consumers margin always
dominate the changes in the new ﬁrms margin.
Proof. Both parts of the proof will be shown by performing a decomposition using Leibnitz’s
26Evidence on the existence of an extensive margin of goods and ﬁrms in international trade is provided
by Hummels and Klenow (2005) and EKK05 respectively.
27Ruhl (2005), using a model with adjustment in the extensive margin of ﬁrms, proposes a solution to
the so-called elasticity puzzle, namely the contrast of the low elasticity needed to explain the patterns
of international business cycles with the high elasticity needed to explain the growth of trade following
reductions in trade costs.
28rule to separate the three margins. The change in total export sales of country i to country j
due to a change in variable trade costs is given by:
dTij
dτij
= Ji
Z ∞
φ∗
ij
nij (φ)
∂ (pij (φ)xij (φ))
∂τij
gi (φ)dφ
| {z }
Intensive margin growth
+
+Ji
Z ∞
φ∗
ij
∂nij (φ)
∂τij
pij (φ)xij (φ)gi (φ)dφ
| {z }
New consumers margin
+ Jinij
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢
pij
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢
xij
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢
gi
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢ ∂φ
∗
ij
∂τij | {z }
New ﬁrms margin
.
I rewrite this decomposition in terms of elasticities:
dlnTij
dlnτij
= − (σ − 1)
| {z }
Intensive margin
growth elasticity
− (θ − σ +1 )
| {z }
New consumers
margin elasticity
+0 |{z}
New ﬁrms
margin elasticity
(30)
Notice that dlnTij/dlnτij = −θ, proving part a). For part b), given the assumption θ>σ− 1,
equation (30) implies that for small decreases in variable trade costs the increase in trade ﬂows
attributed to new consumers is always larger than the corresponding changes due to new ﬁrms.
This can be veriﬁed from the expression that represents the derivative related to the new ﬁrms
margin: since for small ﬁrms nij
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢
=0 , any small change in the trade costs that causes new
ﬁrms to trade (∂φ
∗
ij/∂τij) has minimal contribution in the increase in total export sales.
To provide further intuition of the above result I look at the comparative statics of trade
liberalization and in particular I look at the density of exports for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productiv-
ities before and after a trade liberalization. Figure 9 graphs the density of exports for each level
of productivity (total amount exported by ﬁrms of the given productivity) for the endogenous
cost and the ﬁxed cost model, before the event of a trade liberalization. In the ﬁxed cost model,
the density of exports inherits the shape of the Pareto distribution of productivities given the
CES demand speciﬁcation. However, in the endogenous cost model, deviations from the CES
demand for the small ﬁrms imply that the contribution of these ﬁrms is minor in total export
sales and thus the density of sales is hump-shaped. In addition, in ﬁgure 10, I graph the pre-
dictions of the models for the three margins’ contribution to the change in aggregate trade ﬂows
for the calibrated US-Mexico trade liberalization episode with a 9.5% decrease in trade costs.
29Consistent with what the theory predicts, relatively small trade cost changes will imply that
adjustments in the new consumers margin will be substantially larger for ﬁrms with small (but
positive) numbers of consumers before the trade liberalization. The quantitative decomposition
of new trade in the event of a trade liberalization using the model with β =1implies that the
percent contribution to new trade of the intensive margin growth, the new ﬁrms margin, and
the new consumers margin is 56.9%, 14.7%, and 28.4%, respectively. In contrast, the ﬁxed cost
model would predict that the percent contribution to new trade of the intensive margin growth
and the new ﬁrms margin is 56.9% and 43.1%, respectively. Thus, my model implies that up to
28.4% of new trade was not correctly accounted for by previous theory.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I develop a theory of marketing costs that provides a deeper understanding of the
barriers individual ﬁrms face when selling to foreign markets. This theory provides a formulation
of market penetration costs with the feature that additional marketing eﬀorts in a country lead
to higher sales there, but at a decreasing rate. The additional margin of adjustment in the
sales of the ﬁrm is modeled as the extensive margin of a ﬁrm’s consumers. Incorporated in
the workhorse monopolistic competition trade framework with product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrm
productivity heterogeneity, the interaction of this formulation with the CES demand can account
for a number of key observations in the trade data. These observations seemed particularly
puzzling in view of models with a uniform ﬁxed cost of exporting.
The introduction of the new margin of adjustment of ﬁrm sales —the new consumers margin—
captures the large number of small exporters observed in each market. Also, as Arkolakis and
Muendler (2007) show, this explanation is consistent with the introduction of another margin
in the sales of the ﬁrm, the one of more products. Additionally, the tractability of the new
framework makes it applicable for a variety of new applications. In fact, Arkolakis (2007) shows
that it is consistent with a set of new dynamic facts on ﬁrms and exporters documented by
Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008).
An important new prediction of the model is that a signiﬁcant amount of new trade in the
event of trade liberalization comes from previously small, rather than new, exporters. This
30prediction stands in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings of previous theories, which emphasize the
importance of new ﬁrms for the overall increase in trade after a liberalization. With the increasing
availability of ﬁrm-level data, future research can shed light on the empirical validity of the
diﬀerent theories. If it survives this assessment, the model could become an important tool in
evaluating the impact of trade liberalization episodes.
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35Appendix
Appendix A: the maximization problem of the ﬁrm
First, notice that for the case where β>0 the market penetration cost function inherits an
interiority condition when n → 1 since lim
n→1
1−(1−n)1−β
1−β =+ ∞. Therefore, when solving for the
maximization problem of the ﬁrm, that is given in the main text, I need only consider the
restriction n ≥ 0.
Rewriting the problem of a type φ ﬁrm in a Langrangian formulation with the additional
constraint that n ≥ 0:
L(φ)=nLy
p1−σ
P1−σ − nLy
p−σw
P1−σφ
− w
Lα
ψ
1 − (1 − n)
1−β
1 − β
+ λn.
FOC with respect to p:
p(φ)=˜ σ
w
φ
,( 3 1 )
FOC with respect to n :
Ly
p(φ)
1−σ
P1−σ − Ly
p(φ)
−σ w
P1−σφ
− w
Lα
ψ
[1 − n(φ)]
−β + λ =0 (32)
and λn(φ)=0 ,λ ≥ 0.
Using equation (31), (32) becomes
y
σ
³
˜ σw
φ
´1−σ
P1−σ −
wLα−1
ψ
[1 − n(φ)]
−β−1 + λ =0.
Notice that there exists φ
∗, s.t. ∀ φ ≤ φ
∗ this equation holds only for some λ>0= ⇒
n(φ)=0(the constraint n(φ) ≥ 0 is binding). However, ∀ φ>φ
∗ the constraint is not binding
and the corresponding n(φ) ∈ (0,1) is actually the solution to the above equation for λ =0 .
Thus, for φ ≤ φ
∗,n(φ)=0 . For all φ>φ
∗,t h eo p t i m a ln(φ) is given by the solving equation
(10).
I also check the second order conditions in order to derive suﬃcient conditions for this problem
to have a unique solution for n(φ) ∈ [0,1]. Evaluating the ﬁrst and second principle submatrices
36of the Hessian matrix,
A =


∂2h
∂p2
∂2h
∂p∂n
∂2h
∂n∂p
∂2h
∂n2

 ,
results in the following derivations (notice that ∀φ>φ
∗ n(φ) ∈ (0,1)):
∂2h
∂p2 = −σ(1 − σ)n(φ)Ly
p(φ)−σ−1
P1−σ +( −σ − 1)σn(φ)Ly
p(φ)−σ−2
P1−σφ < 0 ,
∂2h
∂n2 =( −β − 1)wLα
ψ
1
[1−n(φ)]β+1 < 0 only if β>0 ,
∂2h
∂n∂p = ∂2h
∂p∂n =( 1− σ)Ly
p(φ)−σ
P1−σ + σLy
p(φ)−σ−1
P1−σφ =0.
Therefore, the principle submatrices satisfy |A1| < 0 , |A2| > 0 .
Since the second order condition holds, the unique pair (n(φ),p(φ)) that solves the equations
(31) and (32), for a given φ>φ
∗, is the unique maximum solving the ﬁrm’s optimization problem
(given the eﬀective price index P). Therefore, the above formulation gives n(φ) as the solution
of equation (32) ∀φ>φ
∗. In addition, for φ ≤ φ
∗, n(φ)=0 .
Appendix B: the share of proﬁts
In this appendix, I will show that the share of proﬁts out of total income is constant and equal
to η =( σ − 1)/(θσ) .28 Notice that sales in j for a ﬁrm with productivity φ from country i are
given by (20). Total export sales in j from ﬁrms originating in country i are given by expression
(25). The total variable proﬁt from production is simply Tij/σ and thus labor income from
production is Tij (σ − 1)/σ. Total market penetration costs are
mij = Mij
Z ∞
φ∗
ij
L
α
j w
γ
jw
1−γ
i
1
ψ
1 − [1 − nij (φ)]
1−β
1 − β
θ
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θ
φ
θ+1 dφ = Tij
[θ − (σ − 1)]
θσ
.
Total labor income of country i from the bilateral trade relationship with country j equals
income from production of goods and market penetration costs:
wijLij =( σ − 1)Tij/σ +( 1− γ)Tij [θ − (σ − 1)]/(θσ)+γTji[θ − (σ − 1)]/(θσ) .
Summing over all j and using:
28For an in-depth analysis of the derivation of the labor market equilibrium in models with heteroge-
neous ﬁrms, see Eaton and Kortum (2005).
37a) equality of income and total expenditure
N P
j=1
Tij = Xi;
b) total labor income of country i is the sum of labor incomes generated in order to produce and
s e l lt h eg o o dt oa l lt h eN countries wiLi =
N P
j=1
wijLij;
c) trade balance condition,
N P
j=1
Tij =
N P
j=1
Tji,
gives that
Xi = yiLi = wiLi/(1 − η) .
Finally, given the above expression, trade balance also implies expression (19).
Appendix C: sales’ distribution
I consider the case of sales of ﬁrms from country i in market j. I proceed to represent the results
as in EKK04 and EKK05 in order to compare the predictions of the model with thed a t at h e y
report.
Deﬁne by rmin
ij the sales for the ﬁrm with threshold productivity φ
∗
ij.The objective is to derive
the distribution of sales denoted by Fij (r).S a l e sr,f o rﬁ r m sw i t hφ ≥ φ
∗
ij, are given by expression
(20). Notice the following:
Pr
£
R ≥ r|R ≥ r
min
ij
¤
=
Pr[Φ ≥ φ]
Pr
£
Φ ≥ φ
∗
ij
¤ =
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θ
(φ)
θ .
However, this can also be written as
Pr
£
R ≥ r|R ≥ r
min
ij
¤
=1− Pr
£
R<r |R ≥ r
min
ij
¤
=1− Fij (r) ,
which implies that
1 − Fij (r)=
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θ
(φ)
θ .( 3 3 )
Replacing (33) into (20) obtains that sales for ﬁrms with r ≥ rmin
ij are given by
r = L
α
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i
σ
˜ ψ
³
[1 − Fij (r)]
−1/˜ θ − [1 − Fij (r)]
−1/(˜ θ˜ β)
´
,r ≥ r
min
ij .
38For β → 0, I can solve for the distribution of sales analytically and derive the expression (28).
Therefore, in this case, the sales distribution is Pareto with coeﬃcient −1/˜ θ as in EKK05 and
Chaney (2007). However, the cases that I introduce emerge for β>0. Ic a ns o l v ef o rt h es a l e s
distribution for some cases analytically. For example, when β =1 , the distribution of sales is
given by expression (29).
Appendix D: calibration
Parameters determining the relative sales of ﬁrms First, notice that in the model there
is a strict hierarchy of destinations depending on φ
∗
ij,s ot h a tn oﬁ r mi so b s e r v e dt os e l lt oal e s s
popular destination without selling to a more popular one. However, this prediction is not always
observed in the data as EKK05 point out. Using entry shocks, EKK05 can generate patterns of
entry that violate hierarchy. Their general setup can also be adapted in thec o n t e x to fm ym o d e l .
Denote by M
(k)
ij the measure of ﬁrms from country i selling to country j, also selling to k or
more less popular markets. The probability that a ﬁrm from country i selling in j also sells to k
or more less popular markets is
M
(k)
ij
M
(0)
ij
.
Deﬁne the minimum productivity of a ﬁrm from i selling to j and at least k more markets by φ
(k)
ii .
The probability of selling to at least k markets conditional on selling in j can also be written as
Ã
φ
∗
ij
φ
(k)
ij
!θ
,
and thus,
φ
∗
ij
φ
(k)
ij
=
Ã
M
(k)
ij
M
(0)
ij
! 1
θ
.( 3 4 )
Total sales in market j of ﬁrms from market i s e l l i n ga l s ot oa tl e a s tk other destinations are
equal to (exploiting the market hierarchy)
T
(k)
ij = M
(k)
ij L
α
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i
1
˜ ψ
Z ∞
φ
(k)
ij
"µ
φ
φ
∗
ij
¶σ−1
−
µ
φ
φ
∗
ij
¶(σ−1)/˜ β#
θ
³
φ
(k)
ij
´θ
φ
θ+1 =⇒
39T
(k)
ij = Ji
bθ
i ¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θL
α
j y
γ
jy
1−γ
i
1
˜ ψ

 1
1 − 1/˜ θ
Ã
φ
(k)
ij
φ
∗
ij
!σ−1−θ
−
1
1 − 1/
³
˜ θ˜ β
´
Ã
φ
(k)
ij
φ
∗
ij
!(σ−1)/˜ β−θ
 .
The last expression delivers expressions (21), (22) in the main text with the use of (34) and
setting i,j = F.
Regarding the estimation of β using the relationships derived above, an OLS regression of
the natural logarithm of total sales in France on the natural logarithm of the number of ﬁrms
selling to at least a given number of countries, yields a coeﬃcient of 0.353 and constant of 13.42.
This coeﬃcient implies that ˜ θ is around 1.546.
Parameters determining total exports and number of exporters The data on popula-
tion are from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. In the case of missing values
I use data from Penn World Tables. Data on manufacturing absorption and share of French
ﬁrms’ sales in particular markets are taken from EKK04 (see their paper for details).
A regression of ln ¯ MFj on ln ¯ λFj, ln ¯ wj and ln ¯ Lj, will result to the following coeﬃcients (robust
standard errors in parentheses, I suppress the constant since it is of no interest):
ln ¯ MFj =0 .87
(.030)
ln ¯ λFj +0 .52
(.028)
ln ¯ Lj +0 .67
(.025)
ln ¯ yj .
The R2 is 0.913 and the coeﬃcients on ln ¯ Lj and ln ¯ yj are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
each other at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on ln ¯ λFj is close to 1, consistent to what is reported
by EKK04, but not exactly 1 as my theory would imply. Thus, to be able to extract coeﬃcients
that are consistent with the overall analysis based on my model, I used the ones obtained from
the regression reported in the text (which are the coeﬃcients of running the regression reported
in this note but restricting the coeﬃcient of ln ¯ λFj to be 1).
Appendix E: data description
Trade by goods data I use import data from the OECD International Trade by Commod-
ity database (www.sourceoecd.org).29 In general the reporting of import ﬂows from importing
29A similar pattern to the one I report for the Mexico-US case emerges for the Canada-Mexico trade
liberalization episode.
40countries is more accurate. The results of my analysis remain the same if I instead use the data
on Mexican exports. The data are recorded using the Harmonized System (HS) 1988 revision
(rev. 1) at the 6-digit level of detail and potentially can include up to 6873 diﬀerent commodi-
ties (in the case of US imports from Mexico there is information on 5404 goods). Data on HS
rev. 1 are available from 1990-2000. I only include data from 1990 to 1999 (10y e a r s )d u et o
inconsistency of the imports of US from Mexico reported by US and the exportso fM e x i c ot oU S
reported by Mexico, particularly for 2000 (note that the results do not change even if I include
data for 2000). Also note that trade ﬂows of the 6-digit level add up to aggregate trade ﬂows
from 1990-1995. From 1996, there is an average of 1%-2% of trade ﬂows that are not recorded in
the 6-digit trade ﬂows. The reason is that the HS was revised in 1996 (rev. 2),a n dt h ed a t ao n
trade ﬂows from 1996 onward were initially reported according to the rev. 2 a n dt h e nt r a n s l a t e d
t ot h eH S1 9 8 8( r e v . 1 ) . I nt h i sr e c l a s s i ﬁ c a t i o n ,g o o d st h a tc o u l dn o tb ec a t egorized back in
rev. 1 were discarded. Even though some of the trade ﬂows are missing at the 6-digit level,
there is no observable persistent inconsistency that could lead to a mistak e ni n t e r p r e t a t i o no f
the data. Finally, I drop 2 categories of goods from my sample: special classiﬁcation provisions
(code 980100) and Intrastat estimation of missing declarations of chapter 99 (code 999900).
Grouping the goods First, I analyze in detail how I categorize the “previously traded” goods.
I ﬁrst look at the years 1990-92. I keep the goods being traded throughout all the years 1990-92.
I group the goods that were traded in 1990-92 into ten categories, each with an equal number of
goods. The categories include goods in increasing order of volume of trade during 1990-92 (e.g.
category 1 contains the 10% least traded ones in 1990-92 while category 10 contains the 10%
most traded goods). I compute the ratio of import sales of 1997-99 to 1990-92 for each category
(essentially taking averages over 1990-92 and 1997-99). By considering only the goods that are
traded throughout all years of 1990-92, I avoid including goods that are randomly or very rarely
traded. With this adjustment I also avoid —to some extent— including new goods that tend to
grow for some years after their introduction before reaching steady state levels and could create
a bias towards higher growth of least traded goods. By allowing for goods that stopped being
traded after 1992 to be in the sample I adjust towards selection of only surviving goods that
would create higher growth rates for the least traded goods categories.
41Related to the deﬁnition of “newly traded” goods, this deﬁnition is admittedly more favorable
towards a higher importance of new goods in the event of a trade liberalization. On the other
hand, the use of the dataset that provides information on goods rather than ﬁrms can create
aggregation bias which will work against the importance of newly traded goods. Because of
the unavailability of ﬁrm level data on trade liberalization episodes, data on goods in very ﬁne
categories of disaggregation, as the ones I use, is the best available substitute.
Mapping the model to the data In order to map the model to the data, I use the assumption
of the theory that each good is produced by one ﬁrm. In the model I am considering the
empirical counterpart of the relationship I computed in the data and thus I map each one of
t h e1 0c a t e g o r i e so ft h eg o o d st o1 0 %o ft h eﬁ r m si na ni n c r e a s i n go r d e ro fv o l ume of trade
and productivity correspondingly. In particular, I consider the total sales of ﬁrms selling the
goods that corresponds to each category. In fact, since I keep track of the same number of goods
throughout time, I only have to compute the average sales of goods for each category. For the
period before liberalization, average sales of each category in the model are given by
T
(k)
ij = L
α
j (yj)
γ (yi)
1−γ 1
˜ ψ
Z φi+1
φi
"µ
φ
φ
∗
ij
¶σ−1
−
µ
φ
φ
∗
ij
¶(σ−1)/˜ β#
θφ
θ
i
φ
θ+1dφ =⇒
T
(k)
ij = L
α
j (yj)
γ (yi)
1−γ 1
˜ ψ

 

³
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´σ−1
1
1/˜ θ−1
φθ
i
φθ
i+1
−
³
φi+1
φ∗
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´(σ−1)/˜ β
1
1/(˜ θ˜ β)−1
φθ
i
φθ
i+1
−
³
φi
φ∗
ij
´σ−1
1
1/˜ θ−1 +
³
φi
φ∗
ij
´(σ−1)/˜ β
1
1/(˜ θ˜ β)−1

 
 ,
where φi,φ i+1 is the threshold productivity corresponding to each percentile of ﬁrms andt h i si s
determined through the expression (33). Similarly, for the period after the liberalization (abusing
notation for the rest of this appendix, I denote with a ˜ the ex-post variables),
˜ L
α
j (˜ yj)
γ (˜ yi)
1−γ 1
˜ ψ

 

³
φ∗
ij
˜ φ
∗
ij
φi+1
φ∗
ij
´σ−1
1
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φθ
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1
1/(˜ θ˜ β)−1
φθ
i
φθ
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−
³
φ∗
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˜ φ
∗
ij
φi
φ∗
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´σ−1
1
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³
φ∗
ij
˜ φ
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φi
φ∗
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´(σ−1)/˜ β
1
1/(˜ θ˜ β)−1

 
 .
In order to determine the ratio of average sales between the two periods I have to compute
the ratios
φ∗
ij
˜ φ
∗
ij
,
˜ Lα
j (˜ yj)γ(˜ yi)1−γ
Lα
j (yj)γ(yi)1−γ. For the ratio
φ∗
ij
˜ φ
∗
ij
I use the following expression of φ
∗
ij in terms of yi,
42yj, Lj,
¡
φ
∗
ij
¢θ =
Jibθ
iy
1−γ
i
λij
µ
1
1−1/˜ θ − 1
1−1/(˜ θ˜ β)
¶
L
1−α
j y
1−γ
j ˜ ψ
.
Using the assumption that there is no change in Ji,b i ,30
φ
∗
ij
˜ φ
∗
ij
=
Ã
˜ λij
λij
(yi)
1−γ
(˜ yi)
1−γ
˜ L
1−α
j (˜ yj)
1−γ
L
1−α
j (yj)
1−γ
!1/θ
.
Therefore, the only required information to determine the yet undetermined ratios
φ∗
ij
˜ φ
∗
ij
,
˜ Lα
j (˜ yj)γ(˜ yi)1−γ
Lα
j (yj)γ(yi)1−γ
is λij, Lj, yj. I describe how I construct these ratios in the next paragraph.
For the particular calibration exercise that I perform, i corresponds to Mexico (M)a n dj to
the US (U). Data on LM,L U are from World Development Indicators. To obtain yM, WU, I
use data on manufacturing absorption obtained from the OECD STAN database for the years
1990-92 and 1997-99 and divide these data by the population of each country. Manufacturing
absorption is calculated as gross output minus exports plus imports. I use data for the sectors
that appear in the OECD trade by commodity data, namely i) agriculture, hunting, forestry
and ﬁshing ii) mining and quarrying iii) total manufacturing and iv) electricity, gas and water
supply. Notice that for 1990 the database does not provide data on exports and imports for
US for sectors i),ii) and iv). I choose to consider averages over 1991-92 and 1998-99 for the
manufacturing absorption of US instead of using exports and imports from another source. In
fact the trade sectors i),ii) and iv) is less than 1/10 of the one of sector iii) and inﬂuences the
result to a minimal degree. I ﬁnally pick the ratio ˜ λMU/λMU so that I generate the overall
increase in trade among goods traded during 1990-92. This corresponds (alle l s ee q u a l )i na
change of the variable trade cost by around 9.5% for the model with β =1a n da r o u n d1 2 . 5t o
the model with β =0(see equation 23).
30Extending to the case where Ji,bi change would deliver the same results (but complicate notation).
43“Newly “Newly “Previously Traded”
non- traded” by category
traded” 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Share of ’90-’92 trade .13 .85 .12 .01 .05 .11 .23 .45 .86 1.78 3.52 7.64 84.28
Share of ’97-’99 trade .00 3.46 .30 .17 .28 .86 .64 1.68 1.67 2.31 7.23 9.26 72.13
Share of new trade - 4.84 .38 .26 .40 1.25 .86 2.33 2.10 2.58 9.17 10.11 65.71
Table 1: Percentage trade shares of “newly nontraded,” “newly traded,” and “previously traded”
goods
Share of ’90-’92 “previously Share of ’97-’99 “previously
traded” goods trade traded” goods trade
US imports from Mex (6 digit HS) (%) 15.0 25.1
Endogenous cost model (β =1 ) 15.0 24.9
Fixed cost model (β =0 ) 15.0 15.0
T a b l e2 :P e r c e n t a g et r a d es h a r eo ft h eg o o d st h a tc o n s t i t u t et h e1 5%L e a s tT raded “Previously
Traded” goods in 1990-92
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Figure 1: Marginal cost to reach additional consumers under diﬀerent β’s
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Figure 5: Sales per ﬁrm as a function of productivity in the two models
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Figure 6: Total sales in France and number of ﬁrms selling to at least k countries
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Figure 9: Density of exports in the ﬁxed cost and the endogenous cost models
50Figure 10: Trade liberalization and the margins of trade
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